The role of abnormal trading volume on Italian Stock Market is here investigated. According to Fama's definition of Market Efficiency, no relevancy is left for trading volume. Prices fully reflect all the firm information, so that extra trading investor's activity cannot have any informative power. In this paper, it is supposed that abnormal volumes can be considered as a signal for informed traders operating on the stocks and, as a consequence, this extra trading activity might lead to future extra-returns. Some evidence following this hypothesis is found on this paper. Abnormal trading volume, associated with no new announcements, tend to predict future abnormal returns and anticipate a new information release on stock market. A profitable possible portfolio strategy based on abnormal volume signals is also proposed and analysed.
Introduction
Since Fama [1970, 1976] famous works on market efficiency, several studies have been tried to show limits and deviations from his definition. According to this characterization, a market is efficient when prices are able to reflect all the relevant information about the firm. A change on prices consequently can only occur when new relevant information enters on the market. A stream of research though has tried to examine the failure of market efficiency and the role of trading volume in predicting future extra-returns. Among these works we can ideally split in two main streams of research: those who have tried to analyse the role of trading volume on price autocorrelation and those who have shown its ability to affect future prices. This work can be included in the latter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides a brief overview of prior works on this topic.
Section 3 describes data and sample selection procedures while section 4 shows the methodology used for computing abnormal returns. Finally, section 5 presents main results found in this paper.
A Brief Background
The relationship between insider trading and trading volume has been studied over the last twenty years by many scholars and with several approaches. One field of research has tried to answer the question if autocorrelation of stock returns tends to be affected by trading volume. Harris and Raviv (1993), Shalen (1993) , Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) show that large trading volume affect stock returns' autocorrelation. Especially the last one demostrates that high volume induce negative autocorrelations when the main aim for trading is liquidity needs.
A second stream of works tried to study the role of trading volume made by insiders for price discovery.
Some studies have showed a positive correlation between insider trading and stock price changes, meaning that insider trading affect price discovery more rapidly than non-insider. These results have been taken as a enforcement for those who argue for the legalization of insider trading. Meulbroek (1992) , Cornell and Sirri (1992) , and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) all find, using different approaches for measuring insider trading activity, a significant correlation between insider trading volume and price run-ups.
A third stream of research, and the closest to this work, concentrated its effort working on the relationship between extreme trading activity and future evolution of stock prices. Miller (1977) and Mayshar (1983) postulate a visibility hypothesis for explaining price run-ups following large changes in trading volumes.
According to this thesis, traders who hold certain stocks tend to be more optimistic about their value.
Besides, pessimistic traders cannot affect stock price since short-selling is normally not allowed. As a consequence of these two reasons, when a shock in stock visibility occurs to some company, the number of potential buyers increase, leaving the number of potential sellers unchanged. This brings to price increase. Bernardo and Judd (1996) extend the Miller's intuition of stock visibility, considering the investors risk aversion. In their opinion, just like past returns influence investors beliefs about future returns, higher volumes are able to update traders estimation about the risk of these returns. In other words, an increase on trading volume brings a resolution of uncertainty associated with the risk of returns, convincing risk adverse traders to buy the stock and causing a price growth. Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) investigates the power of trading volume in predicting the direction of price movements. They find a positive relationship between trading volume and returns on the subsequent month. More precisely, they find stock with large (small) volumes experience large (small) returns, hypothesizing a high-volume return premium. The authors also check if this finding can be driven by some factor such as earning or dividend announcements, systematic risk, bid-ask spreads or liquidity explanations, but all these exceptions are rejected.
Sample selection
The initial sample consists of all common stocks listed on Milan Stock Exchange between January first 1999 
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Vol AV
Voli,t = Total trading volume on day t for security i
The abnormal volume index for a security i on day t is the ratio between the total volume traded over its 30 trading days 2 mean. By definition and hypothesizing stationery on volume distribution frequency over time, an AV index is supposed to have mean equal to one. Therefore, abnormal positive volumes are detected with extremely high values of the index.
An AV index larger than 5 has been considered as cut-off in this work and it is called "event" here after. A trading volume five times as much as normal (mean) is considered an extremely high level and the hypothesis here presented is that such level has some predictive power about future prices. Selecting from the considered period all the AV Index equal or greater than 5, we obtain 2.322 observations.
1 The second biggest Italian financial web sites.
2 With positive trading. In order to have a real measure of abnormal volume, days with no trading are excluded from computation of average trading volume.
[Here Insert Table 1]   Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of AV Index. In order to study AV Index frequency distribution, 5% of overall observations in our sample period have been randomly selected. As it can be easily observed, the distribution is left skewed indicating that more often low trading volume occurs. Moreover, from the analysis of percentiles it can be easily seen that 90% of times traded volume is under 2,06 times its mean, suggesting that an abnormal volume index equal to 5 is a very extraordinary event. As a manner of fact, an Abnormal volume index larger than 5 corresponds to 1,5% of whole observations. After this first screen of 2.322 events, observations with some missing data have been excluded. 2.207 events were left. For each event a [-19 , +19] window of returns have been computed as natural logarithms of the ratio between prices in following trading days.
In order to exclude from sample some overlapping observations, events with an AV Index > 5 in [1, +19] trading day's window have been excluded. After this new screen 1.167 observations were left. The reason for this is avoiding reproducing the same event in several observations. Suppose that for some reason investors start trading, leading to abnormal volumes on a particular stock for two following days, reaching an AV index value larger than 5 in both days. An overlapping event would occur. In this situation we would have two observations but both referred to same event. In this paper's view the information content is assumed to be related to the first day with abnormal volume. The exclusion of observations with AV Index > 5 in [+1, +19] allow us to define the event as the first observation of abnormal volume higher than 5 in the last 19 trading days.
[Here Insert Table 2]   Table 2 lists the sample so far described. 1.167 observations are related to 290 securities listed at Milan Stock Exchange. Comparing this last feature with the total number of securities listed (around ## at the end of December 2000), we can state this sample includes almost the complete Italian stock market. Moreover, looking at the number of event concerning each security, we can see that there is not a dramatic concentration of events in any of the security. These two evidences bring some robustness to this work. As a manner of fact, it is possible to claim that results will be here presented are not specific to some securities 3 considering that these have been drawn from almost the entire Italian stock market and no particular concentration of events on specific firms have been found. For concluding some remarks concerning sample selection, it has to be said that most of analysis that will be shown in this paper will regard a sample of 863 events, obtained by excluding all the securities included on 3 But only specific to the period of time analysed MIB30 (Italian Stock Market index that contains the 30 biggest companies common stock) and a second sample of 520 events, achieved by selecting only events with a associated announcement 4 in a window [-7, +19] .
The reason for the first sample reduction can be re-conducted to the paper hypothesis. The main assumption of this work is that abnormal trading volume has some informational power because more informed traders usually enters on the market before relevant information are disclosed. This informative advantage is more likely to happen for smaller companies. Moreover, since it has been checked if firm's news were reported around the event (in a window [-7, +19] ) and being bigger companies usually accompanied by an intense media's coverage, this would have caused too much "noise" in detecting real reasons for prices change.
The aim of second sample reduction is related to a specific research question. As long as abnormal volumes are analysed, without checking for reasons that bring a larger trading activity, no definitive conclusion can be inferred. Only after a comparison with information disclosed to the market it is possible to detect if abnormal trading volume may have information content.
Methodology
To determine whether abnormal volume has some information content and it is able to generate abnormal returns, an event study methodology has been used. Hence, it has been studied if abnormal returns on an event day (or day 0) and the surrounding period are significantly different from zero. To measure abnormal returns, a buy and hold methodology has been used: current returns have been subtracted from market returns. Current returns are constructed as the natural logarithm of the ratio between the closing medium prices 5 on day t over its value on the previous trading day. For computing market returns, same procedure has been used on Mibtel Index (Italian Stock Market index, representing the entire listing).
? ?
ARi,t = Abnormal Return for security i on day t Ri,t = Return for security i on day t Rm,t = Market Return on day t [Here Insert Table 3 ] Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for abnormal returns computed on the 39 days around the event (whole sample). Without drawing any conclusion based on statistic analysis, it is worthwhile to notice that whereas no relevant abnormal returns occur before day -2, after that day and till day 0 positive abnormal 4 Firm's news have been extracted from "Il sole 24 ore" CD-ROM, main Italian financial newspaper 5 Computed as the average of the last 10% of daily trading returns are present, reaching on day 0 a 4.32% in mean and 4.14% in median. This is a clear evidence of a strong correlation between abnormal trading volume and extra-returns. At this point of analysis though, no conclusion can be inferred on market efficiency, since no information about news disclosure has been indicated. Another element can be pointed out about table 3 concerns the AR frequency distribution. In the post-event period [+2, +19], while no substantial differences seem to appear in mean and median, a higher degree of dispersion, as it can be easily deduced looking at extreme percentiles, characterize the AR distribution. This can be only motivated by the presence of more outliers.
Abnormal Performance Index description missing
Results
As anticipated on the analysis presented on table 3, abnormal returns have been found around the event date. Abnormal trading volumes are hence accompanied by extra returns. This very first result seems to suggest that trading volume has some informational power. Both the "visibility" and the informed traders hypothesises can offer some sustain to this phenomenon. In the manner, an increase in volume can attract attention on a stock, leading to new purchases and a price increase. In the latter, investors with a higher informational set (or in possess of undisclosed relevant information) would enter in the market bringing both an increase in prices and volumes. According to this second hypothesis, new information would flow on the market throughout an increase in volumes. Higher volume might reveal to less informed traders the arrival of new relevant information about the firm.
Results are organized as follow. In the first part, an examination of market reaction to abnormal volume is presented. As it will be shown, abnormal volumes are associated with strong extra-returns on the two days around the event. Additionally, looking at the 38 days window around the event, we can notice significant negative cumulative abnormal returns on the pre-event period and positive returns in the window after the event.
In the second part, an analysis of market reaction on announcement date is conducted. Restricting the sample only to the observations with related information releases, it has been verified that, whereas a positive market reaction is generally present on announcement date, when information are disclosed after abnormal volume occurred, no significant market reaction is found. This result seems to confirm the intuition that abnormal volumes have some informative power and they are consequently able to anticipate the information disclosure.
In the third and last part, a possible portfolio strategy is proposed and analysed. According to main results found on this paper and previously cited, abnormal volume, for some reason, tend to anticipate information release and future extra-returns. This might suggest that abnormal volumes can be taken as a signal for trading strategies. On these basis it has been tried to build a portfolio following AV index signals. More precisely, a strategy consisting in buying stocks with high abnormal volumes and without any recent announcements and a following selling at the date of news release or, in any case, after 19 trading days 6 lead to extremely high abnormal returns.
i. Main results on the information content of abnormal volume on Italian Stock Market
As previously anticipated, abnormal volumes are characterized by being associated with abnormal returns.
This first result can be still consistent with Fama's theory of market efficiency as long as the price increase is accompanied by an arrival of new relevant information about the company. If this is the case, it can be also expected an increase in volume. This is the reason why, in this work, the examination of abnormal volume has been related to the firm's announcement.
Nevertheless, the very first analysis here presented wants to examine the relation between abnormal volume and extra-return, without considering the information disclosure. Table 4 lists, for all 39 days around the event, abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) relatively to the whole sample of 863
observations. In particular, for CAR, two different measures has been considered: CAR [ -19, +19], corresponding to a cumulate of abnormal return for the entire observation window and CAR [+2, +19] corresponding to the, so-called, post-event period. The role of this last gauge is considering the behaviour of prices after abnormal volumes have occurred, in order to verify if possible trading rules can be applied.
[Here Insert Table 4] Looking at the price behaviour, it is possible to notice that positive and strongly significant abnormal returns subsist on the 3 days around the event. 1.77% and 4.37% abnormal returns are respectively on day -1 and 0, indicating that, generally, abnormal volumes follow good news or, according this work hypothesis, they signal the entrance of positive information concerning the company. It is also worth to observe that in the window [ -19, -2] -from now on called pre-event period -several significant abnormal returns exists.
Furthermore, all of them are negative. This result is also reflected on the CAR [-19, +19] . Considering this gauge in the pre-event period, for instance on day -3, this is heavily negative and strongly significant. CAR is -2.38% with a T-Statistics of 8.49, corresponding to a p-value drastically below the 1% level. This effect does not seem to have a clear reason for being. Abnormal volumes are hence characterized by having a clear price decline on the preceding 16 trading days.
Different seems to be, instead, p rice behaviour after the event. Although almost no significant abnormal returns are found in the post-event window, CAR [+2, +19] is slightly positively significant. A possible explanation for this may be found on information moment release. If some firms in this sample have communicated relevant information after the event (and within the observation window), a positive CAR 6 End of our observation window could be caused by the market reaction following announcements. If this were the case, though, this would indicate a violation of the strong form of market efficiency. An increase in volumes, preceding the information release, might signal better-informed traders (i.e. insiders) operating on the stocks who are also able to gain extra-returns. Some legal consideration can be also done, since Italian law does not allow insiders to trade on their stocks when they possess relevant and undisclosed information.
[Here Insert Table 5 ] Table 5 shows the same typology of analysis previously presented, related to different types of sub-samples.
More precisely, for the whole sample and different sub-sample, cumulative abnormal returns relative to following windows are presented: [-1, 0] in order to study market reaction around the event date, [-19, -2] for the pre-event period, [+2, +19] for post-event period, [-19, +19] for the complete window and finally [-1, +19] so to examine the potential insider's extra-return 7 .
First row reports main results already discussed on table 4 and referring to the entire sample. As said in advance, a strong positive reaction is observed on two days around the event, a negative path of abnormal returns (statistically significant) subsists on the pre-event window and, finally, a positive trend (more slightly significant) on post-event period is observed. Furthermore, a positive and strongly significant CAR [-1 , +19] (7.17%) has been found leading to conclusion that possible positive extra-returns could be obtained by insiders trading around the event date.
If these are the more general results and conclusions that are possible to draw, more interesting insight can be found from the sub-samples investigation. Starting point for the following analyses is considering only the observation with firm's specific information associated in a window [-7, +19] . The rationale for this sample restriction is taking into account only for "explainable events", that are a phenomenon of high volumes coupled with information release. Comparing the exact moments in which the two appear (high volumes and announcements), some conclusions about market efficiency can be proposed.
In the second row, results referred to this sub-sample (N = 520) are reported. No substantial differences can be found compared the entire sample. CAR's seem to follow same path: a strong and negative trend before the increase in volume, a even more significant positive market reaction (7.21%) on the two day around the event and a more significant positive CAR on post-event period (1.06%). This last feature is consistent with the possibility that, restricting the sample only to information release associated events, it is more likely good news are disclosed on the post-event window.
The following sub-sample generating criterion has to do with news typology. Using same announcement grouping used by Pitamani and Singal (2001) , sample has been spit in seven groups according the information category. The reason for this analysis is trying to verify if different reactions occur for different information typology disclosed to market. Same analyses as before have been carried out, excluded sub- 7 Here the hypothesis of coincidence between abnormal trading activity and arrival of relevant information to insiders is made.
sample with T = 3 (Analyst recommendations) because few observations do not allow any valid conclusion on a statistical basis. Also for these sub-sample some common characteristics are found: strong positive and highly significant reaction on two days around the event, and positive CAR both for the whole window [-19, +19] According to this paper hypothesis, we should observe a smaller reaction for the first sub-sample and a higher for the third 8 . In fact, if volumes are able to carry some information on the market, its information content should be higher when no recent news has been diffused. Contrary to this expectation, we notice that market reaction for pre-event is higher than the one for the post event period. Nevertheless, market reaction for this last sub-sample is still positive (5.57%) and strongly significant, indicating that when abnormal volumes (above our cut-off of an AV Index greater than 5) anticipate subsequent information release, also an important price increase occurs. This result is perfectly consistent with this paper hypothesis of informed insiders trading on their stocks. Looking at the rest of result, for this panel of data, two more features can be under-lighted. The only not statistically significant negative path for pre-event periods is observed relatively to the pre-event information release sample and the only statistically significant positive trend on the post-event window exists for the post-event information release sample. Those results are relatively easy to explain. Both these two features might be affected by a general positive reaction of the market to the announcements. If this were the case, the negative pre-event trend would be mitigated by this positive effect of news disclosure and in the same way a higher post-event cumulative reaction should be observed by the effect of subsequent announcements.
The last analysis presented is related to the year's event. There are not noteworthy differences between 1999 and 2000. Market reaction to events and post-event window seems to be slightly higher for the second year of measurement.
ii.
Market reaction around the information release
According to this paper's hypothesis, Italian stock market is characterized by the presence of better informed insider traders who usually operate on their shares before information are released on the market. This leads to an information content of abnormal volumes. In other words, an extremely high level of volumes, not accompanied by the presence of news, might reveal insider trading. Results found and previously here reported seem to confirm this intuition. In particular, a strong market reaction has been demonstrated to exist when abnormal volumes occur without information releases, both around the abnormal volumes' day and on a subsequent 19 days' window.
In this second part of this paragraph, a different survey has been done. The abnormal returns on three days
[-1, +1] around the announcement have been studied. The reason is two-fold. First, it has been checked if announcements collected on this sample and referring to this paper observations of abnormal volumes can be considered as "relevant", that is if they are able to sensibly modify price paths. The second aim of this analysis is verifying if abnormal volumes can anticipate the information content of announcements.
[Here Insert Table 6 ] Table 6 presents main results found on market reaction to information disclosure. On the whole sample of 506 announcements (Panel A) it is possible to notice that a positive market reaction occurs both on the event date and on the previous. As a consequence, cumulative abnormal return on [-1, 0] is clearly positive (3.59%) and highly statistically significant. This demonstrates that announcements referred to this paper observation can be considered as relevant and able to change the stocks' market value.
A partially different analysis is presented on panel B. Announcements have been divided in three groups, according to the release moment. A pre-event period ranging from day -7 to day -2 (where day 0 is still the day when an AV Index greater than 5 has been observed), an event period including days from -1 to +1 and, lastly, a post-event period extending from day +2 to day +18. Quite surprisingly a statistically significant reaction to announcements only occurs when contemporaneously abnormal volumes are present (therefore, only for the event period sub-sample). More interesting, looking at the post-event period we can remark that no reaction at all exists 9 . This can be considered as an important result and a confirmation for this work thesis. In this paper it has been argued that abnormal volume has some information content and, in addition, it is able to predict future positive extra-return. The underlying reason has to do, as previously cited and according to this paper hypothesis, with the presence of informed insider traders entering on the market before information releases. If no market reaction exists when a new announcement is made after abnormal volume already have occurred and, contemporaneously it is noticed that extra-returns were present on the day around abnormal volumes we can certainly infer that this high increase in volumes is able to anticipate the information content of following announcements. Further on, it is possible to assume that a strategy consisting in buying shares with an abnormal volume and no news recently disclosed may lead to extrareturns 10 .
[Here Insert Table 7] 9 While a slight positive reaction, although not statistically significant, is found on pre-event period. 10 Verifying this assumption is the aim of the third part of this paragraph.
As a further specification of results found on table 6, market reaction to information releases on the three days around the announcement has been also studied separating by types. Main results are in table 7.
Contrary t o what it has been found on table 5, when no important differences were emerged in CAR's among types of information disclosure, market reaction following announcement appears to be here dissimilar. For sub-sample with T = 1 (Actual earnings announcement by management) we observe lowest, but still positive and significant, reaction (CAR [-1, 0] = 0.76%), whilst for other types of announcement we found CAR's sensibly above 5% (for Capital structure related information and for miscellaneous information). The difference between market reaction at the announcements and at abnormal volumes seem to suggest that the latter is only able to signal an arrival of new generic information without indicating the type of announcement that it will be followed.
iii. A suggested portfolio strategy
Presenting main results in previous paragraphs, it is clearly emerged that abnormal volume can be taken as a reliable signal for future extra-returns. As a manner of fact, both when no news is disclosed on the company and when some information is released, abnormal returns are observed around the days of volumes increase. If abnormal volume can represent a signal, a portfolio strategy based on its warning signs can be therefore profitable.
[Here Insert Table 8 & 9] As a assessment, the following portfolio strategy has been tested: a hypothetic investor, owning one dollar, buys a share when its abnormal volume is greater than 5 and, contemporaneously, no new information have been released on a window [-7, 0] . In case another stock experiences same conditions, investor sells a part of first share and buys an equivalent part of the second, dividing equally his portfolio between the two shares.
And so on. The assumption here made is that this investor is able to perfectly divide his portfolio equally weighting all the owned securities. Each share is sold when a new information is publicly disclosed (at the announcement) or, in any case, after 19 trading days 11 . Same assumption is made when a stock is sold and it exits from investor's p ortfolio. Remaining shares are rebalanced in order to have an equally weighted portfolio.
In table 8 and 9 this portfolio performance is measured. The difference between the two has to do with the purchase moment. In the first portfolio (Table 8) shares are bought at the opening price of the day of abnormal volumes, while in the second portfolio (Table 9 ) purchasing occurs at the average price of the last 11 End of post-event observation window. After 19 trading days, we can assume that either abnormal volumes were driven by unjustified "rumours" or no related information will be released.
10% traded on the same day. These two distinctions have been made because diverse is the goal of the two portfolios. With the first portfolio an "informed insider trader" point of view has been tested. Buying a share at opening price when abnormal volumes are realized is not feasible for common investor, simply because usually volumes trigger our cut-off at the end of trading day. In this sense, the strategy proposed in the first portfolio cannot be taken as a trading rule. Informed traders, though, can buy at opening price, since they do not need information coming from volumes 12 . Table 8 reports, hence, possible extra-returns for informed insider traders.
The second portfolio (table 9) can be, instead, considered as a possible trading strategy also for common investors who decides to follow signals coming from abnormal volumes. Since the assumed buying price is the average of the last 10% traded, it is possible to presume abnormal volume trigger and purchasing moment being contemporaneous.
Switching the attention to results presented on table 8, abnormal returns' mean and median are reported for each month of trading. Mean is always positive, whilst median is general positive (18 over 22 months), clearly indicating that an informed trader can gain extra-returns. This result is even more unambiguous looking at the cumulative returns. Here two different cumulative (from the first day of portfolio set up, till the month considered) measures are computed: CAR [0, t] as the sum of CAR's and API (Abnormal Performance Index) that is the compounded daily return. As it can be observed, this strategy leads to extremely high abnormal returns over the considered period. In 22 months of trading, an informed trader 13
would have be able to earn 3,0879 dollar over one invested, on a compounded basis and assuming a reinvestment of profits.
If "super-informed traders" can only follow the strategy presented on table 8, strategy tested on table 9 can be put in place by any investor. Looking at abnormal returns, we do not observe a clear positive tendency across these 22 months, but if we put our attention on monthly CAR's it is possible to notice that even a common investor following this portfolio strategy is able to earn extra-profits 14 . Monthly CAR's range from -3.64% up to +10.0%. Cumulative CAR's and API obtain a further confirmation. Both undoubtedly indicate that a trading rule based on abnormal index indications has been able to generate, on the analyzed period, significant extra-returns. This is also an additional evidence of the validity of this paper's hypothesis according to which abnormal volumes have important information content and they are also able to predict future extra-returns.
Conclusion
12 In this paper hypothesis, informed traders, in possess of new relevant information, are the ones to bring to high traded volumes, signalling to the market the arrival of new releases. 13 It has to be said that this informed trader should have a perfect informational set regarding all the listed companies and not only the firm in which he is involved. This portfolio strategy implies that this investor is always able to possess the new relevant information before this is disclosed to the market. 14 Transaction costs are assumed to be negligible.
This paper shows the informative role of abnormal trading volume on Italian stock market. The hypothesis here conducted is that, although Italian law does not allow insiders to trade on their shares when they have relevant undisclosed information, some better informed traders usually operates before a new announcement is made. This phenomenon leads to a correlation between an important increase of volumes and subsequent extra-returns.
Throughout an event study methodology, an analysis of abnormal returns in a window [-19 , +19] around extremely high volumes days has been carried out. Results show extremely high extra-returns on days around the event (when abnormal volume occurs), a negative path of prices before the event and, finally, a less statistically significant but positive trend on post-event period.
In order to verify the market efficiency hypothesis, a sub-sample of abnormal volume observations with information release associated (in a window [-7, +19] ) is generated. Comparing the presence of abnormal volume with the timing of information disclosure to the market it has been possible to infer some plausible conclusions. First of all, it is emerged that high volumes are associated with extra-returns even when information is subsequently released. Furthermore, checking for market reaction around the announcement date, it has been found no market response when the information release follows abnormal volumes. In conclusion, these results seem to confirm this paper's intuition, according to which abnormal volumes are able to carry some informative content and they are in addition able to predict future extra-returns.
As an additional proof, a portfolio strategy has been tested. Using as purchase signal an abnormal volume with no contemporaneous information related, a hypothetic investor would have earned almost a 40% abnormal returns in 22 months of trading. * and ** indicate that the coefficients are significanthly different from zero at the 1% and 5%
* and ** indicate that the coefficients are significanthly different from zero at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. T = 3 has been excluded since only 6 obs are insufficient for statistical analysis. [-7, 0] ). Selling purchased shares at the first firm's announcement or, in any case, after 19 trading days. Table reports , for each month of trading, mean and median of Portfolio Abnormal Returns, monthly CAR, CAR obtained from first day portfolio set up till end of the considered month, Abnormal Performance Index, mean and median of the number of stocks included on portfolio. Table 9 . Portfoflio Strategy. Buying shares in the day following the event (t = 1) when contemporaneously no new information are released (in a window [-7, 0] ). Selling purchased shares at the first firm's announcement or, in any case, after 19 trading days. Table reports , for each month of trading, mean and median of Portfolio Abnormal Returns, monthly CAR, CAR obtained from first day portfolio set up till end of the considered month, Abnormal Performance Index, mean and median of the number of stocks included on portfolio.
